This paper compares conflict of interest incentives and reputational concerns of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the context of the subprime crisis. We argue that, during up-market periods, ratings levels are affected by both a strong tendency for alignment across CRAs and ratings "shopping" by issuers, while, during periods of economic slowdown, these distortions disappear since CRAs are then more concerned about their long-run reputation. We test our hypotheses by analyzing the gap between Moody's and S&Ps ratings on US residential, subprime mortgage-backed securities before and after the 2007 crisis. Overall, our results show a clear reduction in ratings alignment. Moreover, we find strong evidence that harsher downgrades came from S&P, which had higher ratings before the crisis, and that the gap reduction is strongly correlated with the rating gap before the crisis. We interpret this as evidence that CRAs try to "reverse the gap", to reduce the impact on their (relative) reputation. Finally, we find that harsher downgrades tend to occur for securities not jointly rated and that the relation between downgrades and initial rating is significantly different across the two agencies, this being consistent with the rating shopping hypothesis.
Introduction
Using the subprime crisis as our experimental setting, we study "collusive" behavior amongst credit rating agencies (CRAs) and "ratings shopping" in the context of a large sample of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). We argue that when a crisis occurs, the ratings alignment on jointly-rated securities strongly decreases, since each CRA is more concerned about its own reputation, and thus is more likely to give a truly independent evaluation. Also, we expect harsher downgrades to come from the CRA which was giving higher ratings before the crisis occurred, this behavior also being consistent with a refocus on reputational capital by the agency. In other words, we expect alignment to decrease for cases in which ratings agreement previously existed and to increase when a "split rating" was present.
1 Finally, we test for ratings shopping by studying whether the crisis induced harsher downgrades on not jointly rated (NJR) securities rather than on their jointly rated (JR) counterparts, and whether the relationship between the initial evaluation and downgrade is different across CRAs.
The literature on ratings shopping suggests issuers could choose a particular agency knowing that its evaluation system would be more preferable than its competitors in producing a more favorable rating for a specific security. Baker & Mansi (2002) conduct a survey among rated issuers, finding that only 2.7% of them claim that the rating agencies business model induces agencies to assign high ratings in order to satisfy issuers. Nevertheless, CRAs themselves admit ratings shopping exists -especially for structured finance products, for which there is no markingto-market and unsolicited ratings are not common. In a series of studies, 2 Moody's reports hypothetical evaluations of securities it hadn't rated, finding that average differences would have been higher than those verified on jointly rated securities. Thus, Moody's rating opinions and the opinions of other agencies often diverge substantially in situations when Moody's is not asked to 1 Cantor et al. (2007b) suggests that split ratings mainly come from different rating scales. However, if that was the only major source of misalignment, we should then expect only average ratings level, and not relative valuation, to be affected by a downturn. We verify this is not the case during the subprime crisis. rate a particular security. This is highly suggestive of rating shopping phenomenon: when asking only one agency for a rating, the issuer targets the agency that it believes would assign the higher evaluation. At the same time, this shows that rating alignments on securities evaluated by more agencies is higher than it would have been on securities rated by only one agency.
The crisis on subprime RMBS, starting in 2007, is an appealing context to study the aforementioned phenomena, since it is a widely acknowledged and clear structural break jointly affecting thousands of similar issues, allowing for a comparative analysis of ratings before and after The rapid growth in these products increased the relevance of conflicts of interest as well as ratings complexity. In an analysis conducted by the SEC on CRA's behavior in evaluating RMBS and CDO, they find an inability of analysts to deal with the increased amount and complexity of these securities. They also verified a high concentration in the market of subprime RMBS underwriting: regarding 642 analyzed deals there were only 22 different arrangers, and half of them accounted for nearly 80% of both deal volume and dollar value; in the CDO market, the degree of concentration is even higher (SEC, 2008 Overall, our results show a clear reduction in ratings alignment. Moreover, we find strong evidence that harsher downgrades came from S&P, which assigned higher ratings before the crisis, and that the gap reduction is strongly correlated with the rating gap before the crisis. We interpret this as evidence that CRAs were keen to "reverse the gap", to reduce the impact on their (relative)
reputation. Finally, we find that harsher downgrades tend to occur for securities not jointly rated and that the relation between downgrades and the initial rating is significantly different across the two firms, this being consistent with the rating shopping hypothesis.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review culminating in our core empirical predictions. In Section 3 we present the dataset, while in Section 4 the empirical analysis and results are shown. Section 5 closes with some final remarks and conclusions.
Background, Literature Review and Empirical Predictions
The relevance and importance of studies examining the behavior of credit rating agencies has grown considerably over recent years, and particularly so, since CRAs emergence as a key player in the evolution and regulation of financial markets (see, for example, SEC, 2003) . Market trust in CRA evaluations has driven coupon spreads and debt value to be strongly influenced by ratings (see, for example, Ederington et al., 1987 and Kliger and Sarig, 2000) . Moreover, many financial regulatory institutions have used their ratings as official benchmarks for the credit risk of bonds and structured obligations in defining restrictions on investors' behavior. For example, the US SEC use their evaluations to define in which classes of asset, certain types of agents are allowed to invest/trade, and the Basel II agreement makes bank capital requirements depend on their assets credit risk, which are also estimated using agencies ratings. Therefore, it is quite plausible that the CRAs ratings deliberations influences economic and financial cycles by driving market rate spreads and liquidity.
However, conflicts of interest exist in CRA behavior. Because it is the debt issuer who pays the fees to obtain a rating, rating agencies could be tempted to increase their revenues by assigning higher ratings. Higher ratings would have the effect of lowering interest rates requested by the market and, as a consequence, raise the total issuing volume, which in turn would induce a higher overall demand for ratings. Besides this global effect, assignment of an "inflated" rating would also likely attract more issuers regarding other competitors. This is especially true for complex and illiquid securities such as RMBS and Asset Backed Securities (ABS): fees paid by issuers are particularly high (between 13 and 16 bps), and the absence of a marking-to-market process makes such information produced by rating agencies even more critical.
Collectively, these conflict of interest considerations can produce a ratings shopping effect:
issuers ask for ratings assessments from different agencies, making public only favorable ratings;
CRAs themselves can indicate what kind of enhancement and/or structuring of the security is needed to achieve the desired rating under their evaluation models. Notably, Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) document the rating shopping phenomenon by showing that when issuers can choose from several ratings suppliers, product complexity can lead to rating inflation, even though rating agencies produce unbiased ratings.
Critics of rating agencies behavior claim that the absence of competition does not help to remove the effects of the CRA conflict of interest (see, for example, Bolton et al., 2009 would be difficult for a regulator to distinguish between an exogenous, unpredictable common shock effect and an inflated ratings effect. Conversely, deviating from general alignment exposes a single CRA to either a reputational risk (where they produce higher ratings than peers) or to a loss of potential profits during a positive cycle (where they produce lower ratings than peers). To the best of our knowledge, no similar study exists on RMBS and ABS spreads, which is notable since it is likely that the relationship is even stronger, given the illiquidity and complexity of these securities. Strong correlation between ratings and market spreads also makes CRAs less influenced to promptly change their evaluations as new information becomes available, since this could endogenously trigger a deterioration of issuers' affordability. Loffler (2007) argues that this is a rational behavior, since overly volatile ratings wouldn't furnish greatly valuable information on the long-term risk of the market.
The typical CRA response to this kind of criticism is that their reputation is their most important asset:
6 if ratings were not affordable, markets would not rely on them, thus reducing their signaling power and making no issuer willing to pay for them. Indeed, Covitz and Harrison (2003) find some support for this view, showing that the timing of downgrades does not relate to issuer interest and importance as a customer for the CRA. However, this argument understates three nontrivial considerations: the impact of economic cycles on both (a) the monitoring of CRA behavior and (b) CRAs rating reliability; and (c) the potential gain coming from inflated ratings on complex structured securities when fees are significant.
Beginning with the first point, the attention paid by financial markets to CRA behavior is closely linked to economic cycles, strongly increasing during downturns while being much less effective during expansionary phases. Second, as already stated, illiquid complex securities lack the marking-to-market check for ratings reliability, thus making a misevaluation clearly visible only in the case of a sudden increase in default rates driven by an economic downturn. When this happens, as in Stolper's model, excessive ratings alignment makes it difficult to distinguish between misevaluation effects and exogenous unpredictable shock effects, thus preserving the rating sector status quo.
Third, the costs associated with potential loss in reputation could be overwhelmed by the gain derived from giving less severe ratings. Relevant to this concern, the Bolton et al. (2009) can be rational for agencies to inflate their evaluations.
Accordingly, based on the arguments of conflicts of interest, ratings shopping and reputation effects, our empirical predictions are as follows:
P1: Compared to the pre-crisis period, credit ratings assigned by the two key agencies become less aligned after the advent of the crisis
Underlying this prediction, we assume that during expansion periods, ratings levels are affected by a strong tendency for alignment across CRAs, while, during periods of economic slowdown, this distortion would disappear since CRAs are then more concerned about their long-run reputation.
P2: On average, the agency assigning higher credit ratings in the pre-crisis period invokes harsher downgrades after the advent of the crisis
With this prediction we aim to assess whether reputational incentives drive CRA behavior during a crisis period. We assume that when a crisis occurs, each CRA is more concerned about its own reputation. Thus, we expect harsher downgrades to come from the CRA which was giving higher ratings before the crisis, thereby reflecting a refocus on reputational issues by the agency.
P3: On average, there is a reversal of the credit ratings gap between the two key agencies after the advent of the crisis
According to this prediction, the "reversing gap" phenomenon is assumed to be in evidence regardless of which agency gave the higher rating initially.
P4: On average, harsher downgrades occur after the advent of the crisis for securities not jointly rated compared to their jointly rated counterparts
Not jointly rated (NJR) securities are predicted to receive harsher downgrades for two reasons.
First, if rating shopping exists, these tranches would likely have been more overrated than their jointly rated (JR) counterparts before the crisis; and second, the absence of the competitor evaluation increases the potential negative impact on reputation, as the responsibility for a misevaluation is born by only one CRA.
Similarly, consistent with the rating shopping hypothesis, we investigate the possibility that the relationship between the downgrade intensity and the pre-crisis rating differs: (a) between jointly-rated and not-jointly rated securities and (b) across agencies for not-jointly rated securities.
Specifically, our final empirical prediction is the following: whether the relationship between initial rating and subsequent downgrade is different between the two CRAs. Moreover, while in jointly rated tranches this difference in evaluation might be smoothed by rating alignment, we expect it to be more evident in the single-rated tranches. In other words, if issuers, trying to secure inflated evaluations, target different agencies for different expected levels of rating (i.e. investment versus speculative grades), this should be reflected in different levels of downgrade for a given initial rating among the two agencies in the NJR sample.
However, for jointly-rated securities the general alignment predicted by P1 smoothes this difference.
Data
Since our goal is to analyze CRAs behavior with respect to rating downgrades on non-prime [Insert of tranches had the same rating, and the bulk had a higher rating by Moody's. It is clear from this anecdotal picture that the alignment of ratings dramatically declined after the crisis (consistent with empirical prediction P1), and that S&P became the more severe agency, while Moody's ratings, even though generally more aligned, were predominantly lower before the crisis (consistent with empirical prediction P2).
13
To measure the extent of split rating on JR securities, we follow a standard approach in studies on CRAs: we match Moody's and S&P alphanumerical scales with a master scale based on 21 notches (Aaa/AAA=21, Aa1/AA+ = 20…..C/D=1). Since studies on default prediction accuracy (see, for example, Hamilton and Cantor, 2004) show that the inclusion of securities on watchlist for 12 See Moody's (2007) . 13 A test of the rating difference between S&P and Moody's is significant at the 1% level.
possible future downgrades brings significant information on the level of distress, we consider watchlist inclusion as a 1 notch downgrade (i.e. we subtract 1 from the numerical value previously assigned). Based on our sample, we see that there has not only been a strong increase in the number of tranches rated higher by Moody's, but also the average gap, when S&P is more severe, has strongly increased and is bigger than the average gap when the Moody's rating is lower, for all classes of ratings. For example, JR securities rated Baa by Moody's in February 2008 have a lower evaluation by S&P in 75% of the cases. Moreover, the average notch gap of 4.56 at the Baa level implies an average S&P rating of BB-/B+ on the same securities; and considering only those tranches rated higher by Moody's, the average S&P rating drops to B-(given the average gap of 6.91). In contrast, prior to the crisis, for Moody's Baa rated securities only 9.71% of tranches were rated higher by Moody's while 40.38% of them were rated higher by S&P. However, the average S&P rating was basically very similar to Moody's (there was less than a 1-notch average gap).
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Empirical evidence

Rating gaps and reputational effect on jointly rated securities
To begin, we assess whether and how reputation influenced ratings during the crisis.
To this end, we analyze the gap variation before and after the crisis started using the variable Delta, defined as follows:
where t is the given time period ( The intercept term, ߙ, represents the average gap between S&P and Moody's ratings after the crisis on securities that were similarly rated before the crisis took place. According to P1 we expect this coefficient to be significantly different from 0. More specifically, a negative value of this coefficient would confirm a post-crisis higher downgrade from S&P than from Moody's. The signs of the coefficients ߚ ଵ , ߚ ଶ and ߚ ଷ should be consistent with predictions P2 and P3, which state that ‫ݐݏܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ should increase (decrease) when ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ decreases (increases) for ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ sufficiently distant from zero, while allowing for a positive/neutral relationship when ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ is close to zero.
In particular, if we examine the marginal effects as shown in equation [3] , it appears that a negative sign for ߚ ଷ implies decreasing marginal effects when ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ moves "far" from 0 and eventually becoming negative when the magnitude of ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ is sufficiently large. When the marginal effect is less than unity an increase in the absolute gap before the crisis results in a less than proportional increase in the expected absolute gap after the crisis; when the marginal effect becomes negative, an increase in the absolute gap in June 2007 decreases the expected absolute gap in February 2008 or even results in an expected gap with the opposite sign. In other words, if ߚ ଷ is negative, the higher is the initial rating difference, the greater is the gap reduction (or even reversion) once the crisis occurs, consistent with prediction P3. Thus, we expect ߚ ଷ to be negative.
Moreover, we expect the marginal effect when ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ is equal to 0 (݅. ݁. ߚ ଵ ) to be close to unity, as ABS issues characterized by aligned evaluations before the crisis shouldn't constitute a matter of concern for the CRAs relative reputation. ߚ ଷ is negative the cubic relation comes into play sending the slope into negative territory, consistent with reputation effects dominating such that there is a reversal of the ratings gap.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The estimation results for equation [2] are reported in Table 3 . As shown in the table, we find the estimated coefficients to be significant and with expected signs such that the relationship between ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ and ‫ݐݏܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ assume the shape illustrated in Figure 1 within the ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ domain (-20, +20). First, the estimated intercept term is negative, indicating that S&P tended to downgrade their credit assessments more severely than Moody's, thus confirming P1: after the crisis began the previously less severe CRA becomes, on average, the more severe. Second, as illustrated in Figure 1 , the results for the quadratic and cubic terms indicate that, according to prediction P2, the more disparate are the ratings between S&P and Moody's prior to the crisis, the greater is the move in ratings such that the gap is reduced or even reversed. This effect is in evidence regardless of which agency gave a higher rating initially. This finding is thus consistent with empirical prediction P3. 14 Moreover, looking at the marginal effects, we verify that they become significantly negative within the domain of ‫,݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ regardless of which agency was assigning the higher rating in June 2007. However, it must be noted that the marginal effects become significantly negative (only at the 10% confidence level) for lower rating gaps when Moody's was the more severe agency, a result consistent with S&P generally being more keen to reverse contrary evaluations, as they proved to be higher on average before the crisis erupted.
Finally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the marginal effect is not statistically different from 1 when ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ is equal to 0 (p-value equal to 0.627), supporting the prediction presented above.
14 Our model specification is robust to checks for the model degree using the Likelihood ratio test: the explanatory power of a second-degree model (i.e. including only the constant, ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ and ‫݁ݎܲ_ܽݐ݈݁ܦ‬ ଶ ) is significantly lower than the explanatory power of our cubic model.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Rating shopping and not jointly rated securities
To test prediction P4, we measure, separately for the two CRAs, the difference in average downgrade (measured in the numerical scale) between JR and NJR tranches, excluding JR tranches downgraded only by the other CRA. We verify that, in our sample, the average downgrade for NJR tranches is significantly higher than that for JR tranches for Moody's: the difference, equal to 1.9 notches is significant at the 99% confidence level. In contrast, for S&P, the difference is -0.1 notches and is not significant at standard confidence levels. This finding thus supports empirical prediction P4 for Moody's but not for S&P. This differential finding is not surprising once we recognize the fact that S&P made significantly harsher downgrades on JR tranches than Moody's, this reducing the pressure to be even more severe on NJR tranches. In support of this interpretation, we find that Moody's average downgrade on NJR tranches (6.57 notches) is not statistically different from S&P (6.32), while its average rating reduction on downgraded JR tranches (4.70) is significantly lower compared to S&P (6.42), at 99% confidence level.
Finally, aiming to test prediction P5 we create two datasets: one including all tranches downgraded by Moody's (both JR and NJR) and a second based on all tranches downgraded by S&P (both JR and NJR). Accordingly, we estimate, separately for the S&P and Moody's samples, the following model:
where ‫݁݀ܽݎܩ݊ݓܦ‬ is the difference between the ratings in The expected downgrade for the JR tranche i is thus given by the following expression:
while the expected downgrade for the NJR tranche j is measured by:
where ߙ ᇱ equals to (ߙ + ߚ ଵ ) and ߚ′ ଶ equals to (ߚ ଶ + ߚ ଷ ). [Insert Table 4 about here]
As expected, for jointly rated tranches, the two agencies show a similar relation between initial rating and downgrade, given by the estimated ߚ ଶ : -0.61 versus -0.69. In particular, a negative and significant estimated coefficient indicates that the worse the initial rating on the jointly rated tranches, the harsher is the downgrade and the magnitude of this effect is very similar between the two agencies.
The real difference in the behavior of the two CRAs becomes clear when we look at the NJR tranches (i.e. coefficient ߚ′ ଶ ), confirming prediction P5: for Moody's the relation between initial rating and downgrade is negative, similar to that shown in JR securities for both CRAs. Thus, Moody's downgrade behavior is even higher for soley-rated securities that, before the crisis, received a low rating. In contrast, S&P shows an opposite trend in NJR securities: downgrades increase with the initial rating, meaning that higher downgrades are applied to securities that, before the crisis, received a better evaluation. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on initial rating interacting with the NJR dummy (ߚ ଷ ) is significantly positive and more than fully counteracts the negative ߚ ଶ coefficient: the sum of the two estimated coefficients, reported in the last row, is significantly positive. This finding of a differential downgrade behavior for not-jointly rated securities, is consistent with empirical prediction P5. Results, based on the estimated coefficients, are graphically presented in Figure 2 .
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
These results show that, for NJR securities, both agencies made harsher downgrades on rating grades theoretically unfavoured by their own evaluation methods. In one sense this is surprising, as we would have expected lower downgrades on tranches that should have been already penalized by the evaluation method used before the crisis. However, it might be the case that adjustments on their models parameters after the crisis exacerbate the tendency to penalize more the investment or the speculative grades tranches for S&P and Moody's, respectively. Of course, it could also be that each CRAs ratings on NJR tranches were inflated particularly on grades theoretically penalized by their models, a possibility that could be investigated in future research.
Interestingly, the different relationship between initial rating and downgrades, along with the higher average downgrades, supports the view that NJR tranches were particularly subject to a ratings shopping phenomena, driving inflated evaluations before the crisis and, at least for Moody's, representing a bigger concern for CRA reputation once the crisis started.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the CRA behavior during the subprime crisis. We find evidence that ratings alignment has strongly reduced, and that S&P, which gives on average higher ratings than Moody's just before the crisis, was more severe in rating downgrades eight months later. We interpret this alignment reduction as evidence of more independent evaluations. When a big misalignment was present before the crisis, the less severe agency generally reduced or reversed this gap. Both higher downgrades by the previously less severe agency and the gap reversion on split ratings are evidence of a major focus on reputation once the crisis began. We also find that 
